Abstract. We continue the line of work initiated by Katz (Eurocrypt 2007) on using tamper-proof hardware tokens for universally composable secure computation. As our main result, we show an oblivious-transfer (OT) protocol in which two parties each create and transfer a single, stateless token and can then run an unbounded number of OTs. We also show a more efficient protocol, based only on standard symmetric-key primitives (block ciphers and collision-resistant hash functions), that can be used if a bounded number of OTs suffice. Motivated by this result, we investigate the number of stateless tokens needed for universally composable OT. We prove that our protocol is optimal in this regard for constructions making black-box use of the tokens (in a sense we define). We also show that nonblack-box techniques can be used to obtain a construction using only a single stateless token.
Introduction
The universal composability (UC) framework [7] provides a way of analyzing protocols while ensuring strong security guarantees. In particular, protocols proven secure in this framework remain secure when run concurrently with arbitrary other protocols in a larger networked environment. Unfortunately, most interesting cryptographic tasks are impossible to realize in the "plain" UC framework when an honest majority cannot be assumed and, in particular, in the setting of two-party computation [9, 10, 44] . This negative result has motivated researchers to explore various extensions/variants of the plain UC framework in which secure computation can be achieved [8] , with notable examples being the assumption of a common reference string (CRS) [7, 9, 11] or a publickey infrastructure [4, 7] . In the real world, implementing either of these approaches seems to require the existence of some trusted entity that parties agree to use (though see [12] for some ideas on using a naturally occurring high-entropy source in place of a CRS).
Katz [39] suggested using tamper-proof hardware tokens for UC computation. In this model, it is assumed that parties can construct hardware tokens to compute functions of their choice; an adversary given an honestly created token T F for a function F can do no more than observe the input/output behavior of this token. The motivation for this model is that the existence of tamper-proof hardware can be viewed, in principle, as a physical assumption rather than an assumption of trust in some external entity. (In particular, parties can create the tamper-proof tokens themselves rather than obtain them from a trusted provider as in [34] , and there is no assumption regarding what code a malicious party puts in a token it creates.) Secure hardware may also potentially result in more efficient protocols; indeed, it has been suggested for improving efficiency in other settings (e.g., [6, 14, 15, 18, 23, 31, 38, 42] ). In addition to introducing the model, Katz showed that tamper-proof hardware tokens can be used for universally composable computation of arbitrary functions under additional cryptographic assumptions. His work motivated an extensive amount of follow-up work [13, 16, 20, 26, 28, 29, 47] that we discuss in detail later.
We show here two efficient protocols based on tamper-proof hardware tokens and secure against a static, malicious adversary, for universally composable 1-out-of-2 string oblivious transfer (OT). They have the following advantages:
• Our protocols are based on stateless tokens, which seem easier/cheaper to create in practice and are (inherently) resistant to resetting attacks. Security holds even if maliciously generated tokens are stateful.
• Our protocols require the parties to exchange a single pair of tokens. This can be done in advance, before the parties' inputs are known. The number of tokens is optimal; see below.
• Our protocols are black box and run in constant rounds.
• In our first protocol, the tokens can be used to implement an unbounded number of OTs, rather than requiring the parties to exchange a fresh pair of tokens for every oblivious transfer they wish to compute. Thus, by relying on known completeness results [37, 41] , the parties can use the same tokens to perform an unlimited number of secure computations (of possibly different functions and on different inputs).
• Our second protocol can be based on standard symmetric-key primitives (namely block ciphers and collision-resistant hash functions) and does not use public-key techniques. However, it requires the parties to fix some upper bound on the number of OTs to be realized from a single pair of exchanged tokens. (Though, in this case OT extension [36] could be used to obtain an unbounded number of OTs, at the expense of a stronger cryptographic assumption.)
Inspired by the above, we investigate the minimal number of stateless tokens needed for universally composable OT/secure computation. We show that two tokens-one created by each party-are needed even to obtain a single universally composable OT as long as only "black-box techniques" are used.
(We explain what we mean by "black-box techniques" in the relevant section of our paper.) Our protocols are thus optimal in this regard. Note that a single stateful token suffices for universally composable OT [20] ; our result thus demonstrates a separation between stateful and stateless tokens.
Since protocols based on nonblack-box techniques tend to be impractical, our work pins down the minimal number of stateless tokens needed as far as practical protocols are concerned. From a theoretical point of view, however, it is still interesting to completely resolve the question. In this vein, we show a nonblack-box protocol for carrying out an unbounded number of secure computations (and hence OTs) using only a single stateless token. Our construction uses a variant of the simulation technique introduced by Barak [3] .
Prior Work
Katz's original protocol for secure computation using tamper-proof tokens [39] required stateful tokens and relied on number-theoretic assumptions (specifically, the DDH assumption). Subsequent work has mainly focused on improving one or both of these aspects of his work.
Several researchers have explored constructions using stateless tokens. Stateless tokens are presumably easier and/or cheaper to build and are resistant to resetting attacks whereby an adversary cuts off the power supply and thus effectively "rewinds" the token. Chandran et al. [13] were the first to eliminate the requirement of stateful tokens. They construct UC commitments assuming one-way functions and oblivious transfer based on any enhanced trapdoor permutation (eTDP). They also introduce a stronger The security parameter is denoted by λ. Reference [32] is subsequent work security model in which an adversary need not know the code of the tokens it produces, thus capturing scenarios where an adversary may pass along tokens whose code it does not know, e.g., via token replication. (We do not consider this model here.) From a practical perspective, however, their work has several drawbacks. Their OT protocol makes nonblack-box use of the underlying primitives, runs in (λ) rounds (where λ is the security parameter), and uses the heavy machinery of concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs. Improving upon their work, Goyal et al. [29] show a black-box construction of oblivious transfer based on stateless tokens. However, their protocol requires the parties to exchange (λ) tokens for every oblivious transfer the parties wish to execute. Moreover, a flaw in their protocol has recently been identified [32] .
A second direction has explored the possibility of eliminating computational assumptions altogether. This line of work was initiated by Moran and Segev [47] , who showed how to realize statistically secure UC commitments using a single stateful token. (We remark that statistically secure UC commitments do not imply UC oblivious transfer [45] .) Their construction can be used for any bounded number of commitments using only one token, and the authors note that they can achieve an unbounded number of commitments (with computational security) based on one-way functions. Goyal et al. [29] show an unconditional construction of oblivious transfer (and hence general secure computation) using (λ) stateful tokens. Döttling et al. [20] show how to construct unconditionally secure OT using only a single stateful token. Goyal et al. [28] showed that unconditional security from stateless tokens is impossible unless the token model is extended to allow tokens to encapsulate each other (something we do not consider here). In that case, they show how to realize statistically secure OT in constant rounds using (λ) stateless tokens.
Kolesnikov [42] showed an efficient construction of oblivious transfer from stateless tokens. However, that work does not give universally composable OT and achieves only covert security [2] rather than security against malicious parties. Dubovitskaya et al. [22] constructed an OT protocol from two stateful tokens. Each pair of tokens, however, can be used for only a single OT.
Our work in relation to prior work. We show two efficient protocols for universally composable OT based on tamper-proof hardware tokens. Both our protocols use two stateless tokens (one generated by each party) and run in constant rounds. Our first protocol can be used for an unbounded number of OTs based on a single pair of exchanged tokens; this protocol assumes collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs) and the existence of unique signatures [27] or, equivalently, verifiable random functions (VRFs) [46] . Our second protocol requires a known upper bound on the number of OTs to be carried out, but can be based on CRHFs alone. (OT extension [36] can be used to extend these to an unbounded number of OTs; however this appears to require additional assumptions.) A comparison of our protocols to other relevant work is given in Table 1 .
In addition to the above, we show two other results: there is no "black-box" construction of universally composable OT using fewer than two stateless tokens, but universally composable coin tossing (and hence OT) can be based on a single stateless token using nonblack-box techniques.
Concurrent and subsequent work. Concurrently and independently, Döttling et al. [21] showed a different nonblack-box construction of UC coin tossing from a single stateless token and argue (without proof) that nonblack-box techniques are needed. Here, we provide a rigorous version of their argument. Our efficient, black-box OT protocols using two stateless tokens-which we consider our primary contribution-have no counterpart in their work.
Subsequent to our work, Hazay et al. [32] showed a constant-round protocol for UC computation of any functionality using stateless tokens, assuming only one-way functions. However, their protocol requires (λ) tokens.
Open questions.
The main open question left by our work is whether there is a black-box construction of a constant-round protocol for an unbounded number of universally composable OTs assuming symmetric-key primitives (e.g., one-way functions and CRHFs) only.
Background and Cryptographic Primitives
We let λ denote the security parameter, and let ppt stand for "probabilistic polynomial time." We use standard notions of security [40] for pseudorandom functions (denoted by PRF), collision-resistant hash functions, canonical message authentication codes (denoted by Mac), and digital signature schemes (denoted by (Gen, Sign, Vrfy)), though adapted for non-uniform polynomial-time adversaries. A signature scheme is called unique if for every possible public key vk and every message m, there is at most one signature σ such that Vrfy vk (m, σ ) = 1. Various constructions of such schemes based on number-theoretic assumptions are known [1, 19, 33, 35, 46] .
Let U denote the uniform distribution on -bit strings. An efficiently computable function Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} is a strong (k, )-extractor if for every source X with min-entropy at least k, the statistical distance between
A commitment scheme (Com, Open) is a two-phase protocol executed by a sender and a receiver. In the commitment phase, which we assume is non-interactive, the sender holds an input z and random coins r ; it generates a commitment com. In the opening phase, the sender sends z and r to the receiver, who verifies correctness by checking if Open(com, z, r ) = 1. A scheme is statistically binding if it is binding for an allpowerful sender and hiding for a computationally bounded receiver, and statistically hiding if it is hiding for an all-powerful receiver and binding for a computationally bounded sender; we refer to [24] for the standard definitions. Statistically binding commitments can be constructed from any one-way function [48] , while statistically hiding commitments can be based on collision-resistant hash functions [17, 30] . (In both these cases, the commitment phase requires two rounds; however, the first round can be done "once and for all" during preprocessing, after which any number of subsequent commitments can be done non-interactively.)
Linear Algebra
We briefly review some linear-algebraic facts used in our analysis. Let F 2 denote the finite field with two elements. By default, all vectors are column vectors. If a ∈ F λ 2 , then a T denotes the transpose of a, which is a row vector.
Let C ∈ F n×m 2 be a matrix of rank r . Then ker(C) = {x | C x = 0} has dimension m − r . Letting v 1 , . . . , v m−r ∈ F m be a basis for ker(C), we can extend it to a basis v 1 , . . . , v m for F m . Let e i ∈ F m−r be the ith unit vector. There is a matrix G ∈ F (m−r )×m 2 such that Gv i = e i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m − r and Gv i = 0 otherwise. We call any such matrix G a complementary matrix of C, and let Comp(C) denote some canonical way of computing G from C. Let C ∈ F n×m 2 have rank r = n and let G be a complementary matrix of C. If v ∈ F m 2 is uniform, then Cv ∈ F n 2 and Gv ∈ F m−n 2 are uniform and independent.
Ideal Functionalities
Token functionality. We model a tamper-proof hardware token as an ideal functionality in the UC framework, following Katz [39] ; see Fig. 1 . Our ideal functionality models stateful tokens; although all our protocols use stateless tokens, an adversarially generated token may be stateful.
Oblivious-transfer functionalities. The OT functionality is standard, but we wish here to model a multi-session variant where the sender and receiver repeatedly (in sequential sub-sessions) execute some agreed-upon number m of parallel OTs (in a given subsession). We refer to this functionality as F unbounded-OT ; see Fig. 2 . As highlighted in [29] , the sender is notified when the receiver obtains output. We define the bounded OT functionality in Fig. 3 similarly except that the sender and receiver only execute a single session of m parallel OTs. Using OT preprocessing, this allows the sender and receiver to execute m sequential OTs with adaptively chosen inputs.
Oblivious Transfer Using Two Stateless Tokens
We begin in Sect. 3.1 by describing the intuition behind our protocols. In Sect. 3.2, we describe a protocol that allows the parties to execute an unbounded number of OTs based on the exchange of a single pair of tokens. We prove security of this protocol in Sect. 3.3 based on the assumptions of collision-resistant hash functions and unique signatures. In Sect. 3.4, we show how that protocol can be modified so it can be based on collision-resistant hash functions alone, at the expense of requiring the parties to fix a bound in advance on the number of OTs they can execute.
Intuition and Background
Our starting point is the unconditionally secure OT protocol from [20] , which uses a single stateful token. We sketch a simplified version of their protocol for the case of a single OT carried out between the sender S with input (x 0 , x 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} λ × {0, 1} λ and the receiver R with input b ∈ {0, 1}. We canonically identify the vector space F λ 2 with {0, 1} λ . The main steps of the protocol are as follows:
1. S chooses a uniform a ∈ F 2λ 2 and B ∈ F 2λ×2λ 2
. It then creates a token T S that, on input z ∈ F 2λ 2 , outputs az T + B, and then refuses to answer any more queries. S sends T S to R. 2. R chooses a uniform full-rank matrix C ∈ F λ×2λ 2 and sends it to S. In turn, S computesã := Ca andB := C B, and sendsã,B to R. 3. R chooses uniform z, h ∈ F 2λ 2 such that z T h = b. It queries z to T S , which outputs V := az T + B. Then, R checks that C V =ãz T +B and aborts if not. Otherwise, R sends h to S. 
Correctness holds in an honest execution since
where we view b ∈ {0, 1} as an element of F 1×1 2 . Security can be argued, informally, as follows. For an honest receiver, the values z, h serve as a secret sharing of its input b, thus hiding b from S. To ensure correct behavior by S, including the way the token is implemented, the receiver checks that C V =ãz T +B. Since the behavior of the token cannot depend on the random matrix C, andã,B cannot depend on z, incorrect behavior is detected with overwhelming probability.
As for an honest sender, note that B . It is crucial that a malicious receiver can only query the token once. In the work of [20] , this is enforced by making the token stateful; the token "self destructs" after the first query.
Extension to stateless tokens. We combine the techniques of [20] with ideas from [29] to design a protocol using two stateless tokens instead of one stateful token. We describe some of the difficulties this entails, though caution that this is only intuition and does not fully capture all the components of our protocol as specified in the following section:
Multiple queries. The main issue is preventing a malicious R from querying the token multiple times per OT. Motivated by similar techniques in [29] , we address this issue by modifying the token so that it only replies to authenticated inputs. That is, rather than accepting an input z as before, the token now only responds to queries of the form (com z , z, r z , σ z ), where com z is a commitment to z using randomness r z and σ z is a signature on com z with respect to a verification key vk S of the sender. Extracting the sender's input. With the above change in place, we are faced with a technical problem during simulation. Namely, even the simulator will now be unable to submit two (valid) inputs to the token in order to extract the sender's input values.
To resolve this issue, we introduce a second, stateless token T R sent from the receiver to the sender that takes as input a, B and returnsã = Ca andB = C B. This allows the simulator to extract a and B and thus to later extract the sender's inputs. As above, to prevent the sender from querying this token multiple times we modify the token so that it only responds to inputs that have been authenticated by the receiver.
We also modify both tokens so they output signatures serving as "proof" to the creator of the token that the token was queried (on a legal input) before a certain point in the protocol. Malicious tokens. A malicious token may try to leak information to the token creator about the queries that were submitted to it. In particular, such leakage could potentially be embedded in the signature output by a token. To protect against this, we require the underlying signature scheme to be unique.
Using unique signatures ensures that the only information leakage that can occur is due to a token abort. Note that such an abort might reveal information about all previous executions, though it can occur at most once (since an abort is evidence of cheating). It turns out that for T S , leakage due to an abort is already handled by the protocol of [20] . For T R , we rely (intuitively) on the fact that an abort leaks only a limited amount of information. Multiple executions. To achieve an unbounded number of OTs using a single pair of tokens, we replace all random values with values output by a pseudorandom function.
The Protocol
Let (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) be a unique signature scheme, PRF be a pseudorandom function, Ext be a strong extractor (with parameters fixed later), and (SCom, Open) be a noninteractive, statistically hiding commitment scheme. Our main protocol π consists of a token-exchange phase after which the sender S and receiver R can carry out an unlimited number of OTs. A formal description follows; see also Fig. 6 . Token-exchange phase. Each party generates a single token and sends it to the other party. The sender chooses uniform k a , k B ∈ {0, 1} λ and computes (sk S , vk S ) ← Gen(1 λ ); it then creates a token T S containing the code from Fig. 4 . The receiver chooses uniform k C ∈ {0, 1} λ and computes (sk R , vk R ) ← Gen(1 λ ); it then creates a token T R containing the code from Fig. 5 . The parties then exchange their tokens as well as their public keys vk S , vk R . (Each party also runs the first round of a two-round, statistically hiding commitment scheme; we leave this implicit.) Oblivious-transfer phase. Following the above, the parties can sequentially run an unbounded number of sub-sessions, where in each sub-session they can carry out any desired number m of OTs in parallel. (If a party ever aborts the protocol during some sub-session, however, the other party refuses to run any subsequent sub-sessions.) The protocol run during each sub-session, where the sender S has input {(
and the receiver R has input {b i } m i=1 , proceeds as follows: 
Step 4: The receiver verifies the signatures just received and aborts if any of them is invalid. Otherwise, for all i the receiver runs the token T S on input (ssid, i, 
to the receiver.
Step 6 (output determination): The receiver computes G := Comp(C) and then,
We sketch the intuition for why the protocol is secure.
Corrupted sender.
Consider what a malicious sender S * sees as part of an execution of the oblivious-transfer phase during some sub-session. S * learns C and {h i }, which-as in the protocol of [20] -do not leak information about the receiver's input bits {b i }. The signatures {σ a i B i } computed by the receiver are independent of the {b i }. The only other information S * learns are the signatures {σ i } computed by the (possible misbehaving) token T S * . Since a unique signature scheme is used, however, these signatures are uniquely determined by values that are independent of the {b i }, and so T S * cannot communicate information about the {b i } back to S * .
The preceding statement is true except for one subtlety: T S * can potentially communicate information to S * by aborting (i.e., refusing to output a valid signature) at some point in the protocol. Note further that such an abort can, in general, depend on all previous oblivious-transfer phases that have been executed. Nevertheless, because the token can only abort once (after which point the receiver refuses to run any subsequent executions), and there are polynomially many executions overall, this strategy can be used to leak only O(log λ) bits of information to S * . Moreover, this leakage cannot depend on the {h i }. (Here we rely on the fact that the {σ z i } cannot convey additional information from S * to T S * , again because a unique signature scheme is used.) We show that even with this leakage, S * gets only negligible information on the {b i } of any sub-session. Roughly speaking, this is a consequence of the fact that b i = z T i h i is statistically close to uniform, even conditioned on h i , as long as z i has sufficient min-entropy.
Looking ahead, as part of the proof of security we will need to show how a simulator can extract the effective inputs of S * . This will be done as follows. For each sub-session ssid and index i, the malicious sender must query the token T R on some valid input or else the receiver will abort in step 4; this follows from unforgeability of the signature scheme. Moreover, for any pair (ssid, i), the malicious sender can only (usefully) query
) for a single pair a i , B i ; this follows from statistical binding of the commitment scheme and unforgeability of the signature scheme. From this (unique) query, the simulator can determine a i , B i and use those to define the sender's effective inputs. Corrupted receiver. We show that a malicious receiver R * learns only one of the sender's inputs in each OT carried out in some sub-session. During an execution, R * learns }. However, the fact that a unique signature scheme is used means that these signatures are uniquely determined by values that R * already knows, and so there is no way for the (possibly misbehaving) token T R * to communicate information to R * .
As in the case of a corrupted sender, the preceding statement is true except that T R * can leak O(log λ) bits of information to R * by aborting at some point, possibly in a subsequent sub-session. It is for this reason that we apply a strong extractor to G B i h i and G B i h i + Ga i , rather than using those values directly as masks for the sender's inputs.
In the formal proof, we will need to show how a simulator can extract the effective inputs of R * . This is done by again observing that for each sub-session ssid and index i, the malicious receiver can (usefully) query the token T S on inputs (ssid, i, com z i , z i , r z i , σ z i ) for only a single z i . With z i and h i known, the simulator can extract the malicious receiver's effective input. To prove the theorem, we construct a straight-line simulator Sim such that no nonuniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish between (1) an execution involving an honest party and a corrupted party (that without loss of generality, we may take as the dummy adversary who simply forwards messages to/from Z) running protocol π in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving the same honest party, functionality F unbounded-OT and Sim in the ideal world. We consider the cases of a corrupted sender and a corrupted receiver separately.
Proof of Security

Corrupted Sender
We show a simulator Sim such that no non-uniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish (1) an execution between an honest receiver running π and the dummy adversary A (who simply forwards messages to/from Z) in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving an honest receiver, functionality F unbounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. In addition, Sim simulates the following interactions with A.
Tokens. Sim simulates A's receipt of a token from the honest receiver (formally, via the F wrap functionality) by computing (sk R , vk R ) ← Gen(1 λ ) and giving (ready, sid, R, S ) and vk R to A. It then waits to receive vk S as well as a message (create, sid, S, R , M A ) from A to the F wrap functionality, and records M A . For readability, we let F R wrap (resp., F S wrap = M A ) denote the F wrap functionality corresponding to the receiver's (resp., sender's) token.
When A queries F R wrap , the simulator answers the query as in Fig. 5 Simulation of the execution for sub-session ssid. The simulator Sim proceeds as follows:
1. Receive commitments {com a i B i } in step 1 of the protocol. 2. In step 2, a random function is used in place of PRF k C (·) (as discussed above).
Sim also chooses h i , z i subject to z T i h i = 0 for all i and runs the rest of this step honestly using these values. Let {σ a i B i } be the signatures sent to A. 
In step 4, after receiving
Assuming it did not abort, Sim sends the next message of the protocol exactly as the honest receiver would.
Upon receiving {(v
) to functionality F unbounded-OT . Let Real denote the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution of π between an honest receiver and A in the F wrap -hybrid world. (We stress that the view of Z includes the view of A as well as the outputs of the honest receiver.) We show that this is computationally indistinguishable from Ideal, the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution between an honest receiver, F unbounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. To prove this, we consider a sequence of experiments as described next.
Experiment H 1 . In this experiment, we imagine an interaction between a simulator Sim (playing the role of the sender), the honest receiver, and F unbounded-OT in the ideal world, but where Sim is given the inputs {b i } m i=1 of the receiver at the outset of every sub-session. Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. It also simulates an execution of protocol π with A, by playing the role of the receiver itself using the inputs {b i } m i=1 . As part of this simulation, Sim emulates F R wrap and interacts with F S wrap . A query to F R wrap is defined to be valid as above, and after each valid query (ssid, i, com a B , a, B, r a B , σ a B ) , the simulator records (ssid, i, a, B) .
When execution of a sub-session of π is complete then, if it was not aborted, Sim obtains outputs {x
) to the functionality F unbounded-OT . It is immediate that the view of Z in H 1 is distributed identically to its view in Real.
Experiment H 2 . This experiment is the same as the previous one, except that here Sim uses a random function in place of PRF k C (·). It is clear that if PRF is a pseudorandom function, then the view of Z here is computationally indistinguishable from its view in H 1 .
Experiment H 3 . This experiment is the same as the previous one except that if, at any point during the experiment, A makes a valid query (ssid, i, com a B , a, B, r a B , σ a B ) to F R wrap but σ a B was not previously generated by the simulator as a signature on ssid i 0 com a B , the simulator aborts. It is easy to see that strong unforgeability of the signature scheme (which is implied by unforgeability and uniqueness of the signature scheme) means that the view of Z in this experiment is computationally indistinguishable from its view in H 2 . Experiment H 5 . This is identical to the previous experiment, except that upon receiving a message {(ã i ,B i , σã
from A the simulator proceeds as follows: It first verifies the signatures and aborts if they are invalid (as in the previous experiment). Otherwise 
Intuitively, this occurs with negligible probability since F S wrap does not have any information about C. We now prove this formally.
We bound the probability of the event in question for some fixed ssid, i; a union bound then implies the claimed result. So, let E be the event that (1) the simulation is not aborted before the ith invocation of F S wrap in sub-session ssid, and (2) the ith invocation of F S wrap in that sub-session outputs
, σ z i ) in step 4 of sub-session ssid. Let δ(λ) denote the probability of event E.
Consider running the entire experiment up to the ith invocation of F S wrap in subsession ssid and then rewinding and choosing a fresh, uniform value C for that subsession (keeping all other random choices the same as in the first run of the experiment). Using Jensen's inequality, we have that with probability at least δ(λ) 2 event E occurs in both executions. Let a i , B i denote the values recorded by the simulator in the first execution, and let a i , B i denote the values recorded by the simulator in the second execution. Note that:
• The probability that (a i , B i ) = (a i , B i ) is negligible, by straightforward reduction to the binding of the commitment scheme. (Note that the sender commits to a i , B i before learning C.) • The probability that E occurs in both executions if
To see this, note that V i must be the same in both executions, since the input to F S wrap is the same in both executions. (Here we rely on uniqueness of the signature scheme.) So the probability that E occurs in both executions is at most the probability that the value C in the second execution satisfies
is chosen uniformly and independently of everything else, this probability is at most 2 −2λ .
We conclude that the probability that E occurs in both executions (i.e., δ(λ) 2 ) is negligible; hence, δ(λ) is negligible as well.
Experiment H 7 . Now, in step 6, Sim finds the unique record of the form (ssid, i, a i , B i ) for each i. The simulator then computes
The rest of its execution is as before. We claim that the views of Z in H 6 
, where V i is the value it received from F S wrap in step 4. But then in H 7 we have
and so the result computed for x b i i in H 7 is the same. Experiment H 8 . This is identical to the previous experiment, except that now Sim
We prove that the distributions on the view of Z in H 7 and H 8 are statistically close. Note that this is not hard to prove if there is only a single execution of the protocol: in that case, the view of F S wrap is independent of the {h i }, and the view of A is independent of the {z i } except possibly for one bit of information that F S wrap can transmit by aborting. When we consider multiple sequential executions, however, the situation becomes more complicated since subsequent executions can (potentially) be used to transmit information between A and F S wrap about previous sub-sessions. To analyze this possibility, we consider a sequence H 0 7 , H 1 7 , . . . of hybrid experiments between H 7 and H 8 , where in going from one experiment to the next we change the distribution of a single z i (i.e., for one index i in a single sub-session) while keeping the distributions of all the remaining z-values the same. We then show that we can construct algorithms A and T that interact in something we call the dot-product-with-equalityoracle game, such that the advantage of A in that game is related to the difference between the probabilities with which Z outputs 1 in two consecutive hybrid experiments. Finally, we show in Theorem 5 (see Appendix A) that the advantage of any A in the dot-productwith-equality-oracle game is negligible.
The dot-product-with-equality-oracle game is defined as follows: First, a uniform bit b is chosen. Values z, h ∈ F 4λ 2 are then chosen uniformly subject to z T h = b and h nonzero; next, A is given h, and T is given z. Parties A and T then interact with a third party for at most p(λ) rounds; in round j, they each send arbitrary inputs a j and t j to this third party, who responds to both parties with a bit indicating whether a j and t j are equal. If so, the parties continue to the next round; once a j = t j the protocol ends. (Otherwise, the protocol ends in round p(λ).) When the protocol ends, A outputs a guess for b and succeeds if its guess is correct. The advantage of A is the absolute value of its probability of success minus 1/2. We prove in Appendix A that for any (even all-powerful) A, T , and polynomial p, the advantage of A in this game is negligible.
We now show how to map the experiments in question to an execution of the above game. For concreteness, consider the case where the distribution of z j in sub-session is changed. We define (unbounded) algorithms A and T as follows. At a high level, algorithms A and T will each encapsulate the entire experiment-including A, Sim , the F unbounded-OT functionality, the honest receiver, and Z-using shared randomness, except that A uses its input h for the value of h j in sub-session and T uses its input z for the value of z j in sub-session .
Explicitly, A runs the entire experiment internally. For sub-sessions 1 through − 1, it simulates the entire interaction between A and Sim in the obvious way, including simulation of F S wrap . In sub-session , it simulates rounds 1-3 of the protocol and then sends 1 to the (external) third party computing equality; if that party returns 0, then A simulates Sim sending an abort for the fourth message of the protocol, passes the view of A to Z, and outputs whatever Z outputs. Otherwise, A continues to the fourth round of the protocol, using values {h i } chosen in advance except that it sets h j equal to its input h. Execution of the rest of sub-session continues in the natural way.
For sub-sessions + 1 and on, A simulates each sub-session in the natural way until after the third message of the protocol. It then computes
as Sim would and
to the (external) third party computing equality. If that party returns 0, then A simulates Sim sending an abort for the fourth message of the protocol, passes the view of A to Z, and outputs what Z outputs. Otherwise, A continues simulation of the experiment until Z generates output.
We now describe algorithm T . As noted above, A and T share randomness in advance, and this allows T to simulate sub-sessions 1 through − 1 exactly as A does. In subsession , it simulates rounds 1-3 of the protocol and then queries F S wrap using {z i } chosen in advance except that z j is set equal to its input z. (One subtlety is that A and T must agree on the commitment com z j used in sub-session even though they don't know z j in advance. But since the commitment is statistically hiding and T is unbounded, T can decommit to z j = z except with negligible probability.) It receives in return {(V i , σ i )} and checks whether V i = a i z T i + B i for all i; if so, it sends 1 to the (external) third party computing equality, and otherwise it sends 0.
For sub-sessions + 1 and on, T simulates each sub-session in the natural way until after the third message of the protocol. It then queries F S wrap and receives in return
. Assuming the signatures verify, it sends {V i } m i=1 to the (external) third party computing equality.
One can check that the interaction between A and T in the dot-product-with-equalityoracle game results in a perfect simulation of the entire experiment for Z. (We highlight the fact that the experiment is independent of h and z until F S wrap is queried after round 3 of sub-session . At that point, the view of F S wrap -and hence its decision whether to output correct values {V i }-depends on z only. It is only after the round-4 message of sub-session is sent that the view of A depends on h. We also continue to rely on the fact that a unique signature scheme is used, and hence, the {σ z i } are determined by the {com z i }.) Thus, any difference in the output of Z based on the value of z T i h i would result in a difference in the output of A based on that information. Theorem 5 implies that the experiments are therefore indistinguishable by Z.
Since H 8 is identical to Ideal, this concludes the proof of Theorem 1 for a corrupted sender.
Corrupted Receiver
We show a simulator Sim such that no non-uniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish (1) an execution between an honest sender running π and the dummy adversary A (who simply forwards messages to/from Z) in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving an honest sender, functionality F unbounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. In addition, Sim simulates the following interactions with A.
Tokens. Sim simulates A's receipt of a token from the honest sender in the natural way, including generation of keys (vk S , sk S ) for the signature scheme. It then waits to receive vk R as well as a message (create, sid, R, S , M A ) from A to the F wrap functionality and records M A . For readability, we let F S wrap (resp., F R wrap = M A ) denote the F wrap functionality corresponding to the sender's (resp., receiver's) token.
When A queries F S wrap , the simulator answers the query as in Fig. 4 , except that random functions are used in place of PRF k a (·) and
wrap is said to be valid if Vrfy vk S (ssid i 0 com z , σ z ) = 1 and Open(com z , z, r z ) = 1. When a valid query (ssid, i, com z , z, r z , σ z ) is made, the simulator records (ssid, i, z). If at any point during the experiment, A makes a valid query (ssid, i, com z , z, r z , σ z ) to F S wrap but σ z was not previously generated by the simulator during sub-session ssid as a signature on com z , the simulator outputs abort1 and terminates. If A ever makes two valid queries (ssid, i, com z , z, r z , σ z ) and (ssid, i, com z , z , r z , σ z ) with z = z , Sim outputs abort2 and terminates. 
Simulation of the execution
Real denote the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution of π between an honest sender and A in the F wrap -hybrid world. (We stress that the view of Z includes the view of A as well as the outputs of the honest sender.) We show that this is computationally indistinguishable from Ideal, the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution between an honest sender, functionality F unbounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. To prove this, we consider a sequence of experiments as described next.
Experiment H 1 . In this experiment, we imagine an interaction between a simulator Sim (playing the role of the receiver), the honest sender, and F unbounded-OT in the ideal world, but where Sim is given the inputs {(x 0 i , x 1 i )} of the sender at the outset of every sub-session. Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z, and running the protocol honestly with A using the sender's inputs. Valid queries are defined as above, and after a valid query (ssid, i, com z , z, r z , σ z ) is made, Sim records (ssid, i, z). When execution of a sub-session π is complete then, if the sub-session was not aborted, Sim sets b i := 0 for all i and sends (receive, sid, S, R , ssid,
It is immediate that the view of Z in H 1 is distributed identically to its view in Real. i . But we still need to take into account information that F R wrap might leak to A about Z or X . We show next that F R wrap can leak no information about X , and at most O(log λ) bits of information about Z .
We first argue that the behavior of F R wrap is independent of X (given Z ). This follows because all inputs provided to F R wrap in all sub-sessions subsequent to ssid are independent of X given Z . This, in turn, is a consequence of the fact that all the inputs to F R wrap except the final signature are chosen by the (honest) sender, but-because a unique signature scheme is used-that final signature is uniquely determined by the other inputs.
The behavior of F R wrap can depend on Z . However, because a unique signature scheme is used, the only dependence (besides the valuesã i ,B i already taken into account above) is in terms of if/when it ever aborts. Since at most polynomially many sub-sessions are run overall, we see that F R wrap can communicate only O(log λ) bits to A via such an abort.
We thus see that with overwhelming probability, the min-entropy of Z is at least 1.5λ, and hence, the extracted value X is statistically close to uniform. This concludes the proof that the views of Z in H 6 and H 5 are statistically close.
Since H 6 is identical to Ideal, this completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Bounded Oblivious Transfer from Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
The requirement of unique signature schemes is a strong one and, in particular, appears to require the use of public-key techniques. In this section, we construct a protocol π that can be based on symmetric-key primitives (MACs and collision-resistant hash functions) alone. Here, however, we are only able to realize the bounded OT functionality, in which an arbitrary number of OTs can be carried out, but must be done in parallel.
The main intuition for this protocol is as before: we modify the protocol of [20] so that it can be based on stateless tokens. The modifications are similar in spirit to those introduced in our prior protocol: at a high level, we prevent an attacker from querying a token more times than allowed by having tokens only respond to authenticated inputs. Here, however, we use message authentication codes (MACs) rather than (unique) signatures to provide this authentication. This introduces a potential covert channel between a malicious party and the token they create, since the other party (who does not hold the MAC key) cannot verify whether the MAC tag sent by the other party was honestly generated. We resolve this issue in part by having the parties commit to their MAC key in advance and sending the decommitment later. This allows the honest party to check, after the fact, whether the MAC tag was computed correctly. We also carefully order the steps of the protocol, ensuring in particular that the sender transmits its MAC tag before receiving C so that it cannot communicate information about C via an incorrectly computed tag. The necessity of doing so, however, is why we cannot support any sub-sessions after the first has been completed.
We now describe the protocol; see also Fig. 9 . As before, PRF denotes a pseudorandom function and (SCom, Open) is a non-interactive, statistically hiding commitment scheme. We also let Mac denote a deterministic message authentication code, and let (Com, Open) denote a non-interactive, statistically binding commitment scheme.
Token-exchange phase. Each party generates a single token and sends it to the other party. For i = 1, . . . , m (where m is the number of OTs to be supported), the sender chooses uniform a i ∈ F 4λ 2 ,
, w i ∈ {0, 1} λ , r w i ∈ {0, 1} * ; it also chooses a uniform MAC key s ; it then creates a token T S containing the code from Fig. 7 . The receiver chooses uniform C ∈ F 2λ×4λ 2 and a uniform MAC key s; it then creates a token T R containing the code from Fig. 8 . The parties then exchange their tokens. (Each party also runs the initial rounds of the commitment schemes; we leave this implicit.)
Oblivious-transfer phase. Following the token-exchange phase, the parties execute m parallel OT instances. Let {(x 0 i ,
be the input of the sender S, and let
denote the input of the receiver R. The protocol proceeds as follows:
Step 1: The sender commits to the {w i } using Com and randomness {r w i }, resulting in commitments {com w i }. It sends {com w i } m i=1 to R.
Step 2: The receiver commits to s using Com, resulting in commitment com s and decommitment r s . Then for i ∈ [m], the receiver chooses uniform h i , z i ∈ F 4λ We sketch the intuition for why the protocol is secure, assuming the reader is already familiar with the proof from the previous section.
Corrupt sender. During an execution of the protocol, a malicious sender S * learns C and h i , but we claim that it learns at most one bit of information about z i . Indeed, the only way it can potentially learn information about z i is from the values {w i } output by the (potentially malicious) token T S * . But these values must be equal to the values to which S * commits in the first round of the protocol, or else R aborts. Thus, T S * is limited to causing R to abort, which in turn communicates just a single bit of information to S * .
In the formal proof, we also need to show how to extract the effective inputs of S * from an execution. This is done as in the previous section, by exploiting the fact that S * must query T R on a single valid input or else R will abort the protocol.
Corrupt receiver. Here, we need to bound the information that a malicious receiver R * learns about a i , B i (beyondã i ,B i ) . The only potential information R * can learn is from the output of the (potentially malicious) token T R * -and, indeed, the token could potentially embed a i , B i themselves into the MAC tag τã
that it outputs. However, as long as the sender does not abort the protocol, the MAC tag output by T R * is a deterministic function of the key s (to which R * committed in the second round) and the commitment comã
. We thus see that-if the protocol is not aborted-R * learns at most one bit of information about the {a i , B i }. (And if the protocol is aborted, then R * learns nothing about the sender's inputs.) Since we apply a strong extractor to the values G B i h i and G B i h i + Ga i , we conclude that R * learns no information about one of the sender's inputs.
In the formal proof, we also need to show how to extract the effective inputs of R * . This is done as in the previous section, by exploiting the fact that R * must query T S on a single valid input or else S will abort the protocol. (We highlight here that the {w i } values play the role of "MAC tags," in the sense that they prove the token was queried on some valid inputs.)
Proof of Security for Bounded Oblivious-Transfer Protocol
Theorem 2. If Com is statistically binding, SCom is statistically hiding, Mac is a secure message authentication code, and
Ext is a (1.5λ, negl(λ))-strong extractor, then the protocol of Fig. 9 securely realizes F bounded-OT in the F wrap -hybrid model.
To prove the theorem, we construct a straight-line simulator Sim such that no nonuniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish between (1) an execution involving an honest party and a corrupted party (that without loss of generality, we may take as the dummy adversary who simply forwards messages to/from Z) running protocol π in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving the same honest party, functionality F bounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. We consider the cases of a corrupted sender and a corrupted receiver separately.
Corrupted Sender
We show a simulator Sim such that no non-uniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish (1) an execution between an honest receiver running π and the dummy adversary A (who simply forwards messages to/from Z) in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving an honest receiver, functionality F bounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. The simulator Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. In addition, Sim simulates the following interactions with A.
Tokens. Sim chooses uniform C and s and then simulates A's receipt of a token from the honest receiver in the natural way. It then waits to receive a message (create, sid, S, R , M A ) from A to the F wrap functionality and records M A . For readability, we let F R wrap (resp., F S wrap = M A ) denote the F wrap functionality corresponding to the receiver's (resp., sender's) token.
Whenever A queries F R wrap , the simulator Sim answers the query as in Fig. 8. A query  (i, com a B , a, B, r a B , τ a B ) to F R wrap is said to be valid if Mac s (i 0 com a B ) = τ a B and furthermore Open (com a B , a B, r a B ) = 1. When a valid query is answered with (ã,B, τã B ), the simulator records (i, a, B) . If A ever makes a valid query (i, com a B , a, B, r a B , τ a B ) to F R wrap but τ a B was not previously generated by the simulator as a MAC tag on com a B , or if A ever makes two valid queries (i, com a B , a, B, r a B , τ a B ) and (i, com a B , a , B , r a B , τ a B ) with (a, B) = (a , B ) , the simulator aborts.
Simulation of the protocol. The simulator Sim runs the entire protocol exactly as an honest receiver would using input b i = 0 for all i. Immediately before sending its message in step 6 of the protocol (assuming it has not already aborted), Sim searches for a record of the form (i, a i , B i ) for each i; if there is not a unique such record, or if there is such a record but Ca i =ã i or C B i =B i , then Sim aborts. Otherwise, it continues running the protocol to the end. It then computes
Let Real denote the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution of π between an honest receiver and A in the F wrap -hybrid world. (We stress that the view of Z includes the view of A as well as the outputs of the honest receiver.) We show that this is computationally indistinguishable from Ideal, the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution between an honest receiver, F bounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. To prove this, we consider a sequence of experiments as described next.
Experiment H 1 . In this experiment, we imagine an interaction between a simulator Sim (playing the role of the sender), the honest receiver, and F bounded-OT in the ideal world, but where Sim is given the inputs {b i } m i=1 of the receiver. Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. It also simulates an execution of protocol π with A, by playing the role of the receiver itself using the inputs {b i } m i=1 . As part of this simulation, Sim emulates F R wrap and interacts with F S wrap . A query to F R wrap is define to be valid as before. When a valid query (i, com a B , a, B, r a B , τ a B ) is made, the simulator records (i, a, B) .
When execution of π is complete then, if it was not aborted, Sim obtains outputs {x
It is immediate that the view of Z in H 1 is distributed identically to its view in Real.
Experiment H 2 . This experiment is as before except that now if A ever makes a valid query (i, com a B , a, B, r a B , τ a B ) to F R wrap but τ a B was not previously generated by the simulator as a MAC tag on com a B , or if the adversary A ever makes two valid queries (i, com a B , a, B, r a B , τ a B ) and (i, com a B , a , B , r a B , τ a B ) with (a, B) = (a , B ), the simulator aborts. Security of the MAC and binding of the commitment scheme imply that the view of Z here is indistinguishable from its view in H 1 . Experiment H 3 . This is identical to the previous experiment, except that immediately before sending its message in step 6 of the protocol (assuming it has not already aborted), Sim searches for a record of the form (i, a i , B i ) for each i; if there is not a unique such record, or if there is such a record but Ca i =ã i or C B i =B i , then Sim aborts. Security of the MAC means that the view of Z here is indistinguishable from its view in H 2 .
Experiment H 4 . As in the previous experiment, in step 6, Sim finds the unique record of the form (i, a i , B i ) for each i. Now, however, Sim aborts if V i = a i z T i + B i ; otherwise, it proceeds as before. We claim that the view of Z in H 4 is statistically close to its view in H 3 . To see this, recall that the simulator aborts in H 3 and H 4 ifã i = Ca i orB i = C B i ; in H 3 , the simulator aborts only if C V i =ã i z T i +B i . Thus, the only difference between H 3 and H 4 occurs if there is ever a sub-session and an index i for which
As in the analysis of experiment H 6 in Sect. 3.3.1, one can show that this occurs with negligible probability. (We remark that rather than relying on uniqueness of the signature scheme, here we use the fact that the τ z i are sent by A before it learns C.) Experiment H 5 . In this experiment, Sim uses the values a i , B i that it derived 1 in step 6 to compute
The rest of its execution is as before.
We claim that the views of Z in H 4 
and so the result computed for x b i i is the same. Experiment H 6 . This is identical to the previous experiment, except that now Sim chooses z i ← {z ∈ F 4λ 2 | z T h i = 0} for all i. We claim that the distributions on the view of Z in H 5 and H 6 are statistically close. The argument here is much simpler than in the previous section, since only a single session is executed. It suffices to note that the view of F S wrap is independent of the {h i }, and the view of A is independent of the {z i } except possibly for one bit of information that F S wrap can transmit by aborting. (Here we use the fact that A commits to the {w i } in advance.) Viewing z T i h i as a strong extractor implies that b i remains statistically close to uniform.
Since H 6 is identical to Ideal, this completes the proof of Theorem 2 for a corrupted sender.
Corrupted Receiver
We show a simulator Sim such that no non-uniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish (1) an execution between an honest sender running π and the dummy adversary A (who simply forwards messages to/from Z) in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving an honest sender, F bounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. The simulator Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. In addition, Sim simulates the following interactions with A. chooses {a i , B i , w i , r w i } and s as an honest sender would and then simulates A's receipt of the sender's token in the natural way. It then waits to receive (create, sid, R, S , M A ) from A to the F wrap functionality and records M A . For readability, we let F S wrap (resp., F R wrap = M A ) denote the F wrap functionality corresponding to the sender's (resp., receiver's) token.
Tokens. Sim
When A queries F S wrap , the simulator answers the query as in Fig. 7 . A query
is made, the simulator records (i, z). If, at any point during the experiment, A makes a valid query (i, com z , z, r z , τ z ) to F S wrap but τ z was not previously generated by the simulator as a MAC tag on com z , or if A ever makes two valid queries (i, com z , z, r z , τ z ) and (i, com z , z , r z , τ z ) with z = z , the simulator aborts. 
Real denote the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution of π between an honest sender and A in the F wrap -hybrid world. (We stress that the view of Z includes the view of A as well as the outputs of the honest sender.) We show that this is computationally indistinguishable from Ideal, the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution between an honest sender, F bounded-OT , and Sim in the ideal world. To prove this, we consider a sequence of experiments as described next.
Experiment H 1 . In this experiment, we imagine an interaction between a simulator Sim (playing the role of the receiver), the honest sender, and F bounded-OT , in the ideal world, but where Sim is given the inputs {(x 0 i , x 1 i )} of the sender. Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z, and running the protocol honestly with A using the sender's inputs. Valid queries are defined as above, and after a valid query (i, com z , z, r z , τ z ) is made, Sim records (i, z). When execution of the protocol is complete then, if it did not abort, Sim sets b i := 0 for all i and sends (receive, sid, S, R , i , x 1 i .) We thus see that with overwhelming probability, the min-entropy of Z is at least 1.5λ, and hence, the extracted value is statistically close to uniform. This concludes the proof that the views of Z in H 3 and H 4 are statistically close.
Since H 4 is identical to Ideal, this completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Black-Box Impossibility of OT Using One Stateless Token
In the previous section, we showed that an unbounded number of universally composable OTs (and hence universally composable secure computation) is possible by having the parties exchange two stateless tokens. We show here that (even a single) universally composable OT using one stateless token is impossible using black-box techniques alone. Here, "black box" refers to the simulator's access to the code M encapsulated in the token. (We formalize this below.) Note that the token model as defined by Katz [39] is inherently nonblack box and, in particular, the simulator is given the code M that the malicious party submits to F wrap . Nevertheless, an examination of the proofs of security for our protocols in Sect. 3-as well as in most [16, 20, 26, 28, 29, 47] (though not all [13] ) prior work-shows that the simulator only uses this code in a black-box fashion, namely, by running the code to observe its input/output behavior but without using the code itself. Formally, we consider simulators of the form Sim = (Sim code , Sim bb ), where Sim bb is the main simulator routine and Sim code merely gets the code M that the adversary submits to F wrap and provides Sim bb with (black-box) oracle access to M. (In addition, as required in the setting of universal composability, Sim bb must be straight line.) Inspired by the works of Canetti et al. [9, 10] we show that, restricting to such simulators, constructions of OT from one stateless token are impossible. Intuitively, for any such protocol, Sim bb must be able to extract the input of a corrupted token-creating party after interacting with M in a black-box fashion. The real-world adversary can then use Sim bb to extract the input of the honest token-creating party by running Sim bb and answering its oracle queries by querying the token itself; for stateless tokens, querying the token (in the real world) is equivalent to black-box access to M (in the ideal world).
Theorem 3.
There is no protocol π that uses one stateless token to securely realize F OT in the F wrap -hybrid model whose security is proven using a black-box simulator as defined above.
Proof. (Sketch) Let π be a protocol between a sender S and a receiver R, in which a single token is sent from the sender to the receiver. (The other case is handled analogously.) Consider the following environment Z and dummy adversary A corrupting the sender: Z chooses uniform x 0 , x 1 , and b and instructs the sender to run π honestly on input (x 0 , x 1 ). The receiver is given input b. Once the honest receiver outputs x, then Z outputs 1 iff x = x b . Note that correctness implies that Z outputs 1 with overwhelming probability.
Suppose π securely realizes F OT , where security is proved via a black-box simulator Sim = (Sim code , Sim bb ) as previously described. In the course of the proof, Sim bb plays the role of a receiver while interacting with A , and Sim code provides Sim bb with black-box access to the code A submits to F wrap . At some point during its execution, Sim bb must send some inputs (x 0 ,x 1 ) to the ideal functionality F OT . It is not hard to see that we must have (x 0 ,x 1 ) = (x 0 , x 1 ) with all but negligible probability.
We now consider a different environment Z and an adversary A corrupting the receiver. Z chooses uniform x 0 , x 1 , b and provides (x 0 , x 1 ) as input to the honest sender. Adversary A works as follows (note that A receives a token from the honest sender as specified by π ):
Run Sim bb , relaying messages from the honest sender to this internal copy of Sim bb . Whenever Sim bb makes a query to Sim code to run M (the code created by the honest sender), A runs the token on the same query and gives the response to Sim bb . At some point, Sim bb sends (x 0 ,x 1 ) to F OT , at which point A outputs (x 0 ,x 1 ) and halts.
The key point is that since the token is stateless, there is no difference between Sim code running the code M, and A querying its token. Thus, A provides a perfect simulation for Sim bb , and so (x 0 ,x 1 ) = (x 0 , x 1 ) with all but negligible probability in an execution of π in the F wrap -hybrid world. But this occurs with probability at most 1/2 in an idealworld evaluation of F OT . Thus, Z can distinguish between the real-and ideal-world executions, contradicting security of π . We remark that the proof can be easily extended to show that at least one token must be sent in each direction; that is, it does not help to use multiple tokens if they are all sent from the sender to the receiver.
Coin Tossing Using One Stateless Token
In the previous section, we showed that universally composable OT cannot be realized from one stateless token if only "black-box techniques" are used. We complement that result by showing that UC secure computation from one stateless token is possible using nonblack-box techniques. Here, we find it simpler to construct a protocol for universally composable coin tossing rather than OT. (The coin-tossing functionality F coin is defined in the natural way; see Fig. 10 .) UC coin tossing suffices for general UC computation under a variety of cryptographic assumptions [11, 43] .
At a high level, our protocol follows the general structure of Blum's coin-tossing protocol [5] . This protocol consists of three moves. In the first move (B1), A generates a commitment com x to a uniform value x, and B replies with a uniform value y (B2). In the last move (B3), A sends the decommitment to x and both parties output x ⊕ y.
To obtain a UC coin-tossing protocol that follows this basic approach, we need to be able to simulate each party. In particular, if A is malicious, the simulator needs to extract the value x contained in com x (extractability), whereas when B is corrupted, the simulator needs to open the commitment in an arbitrary way (equivocation). We achieve both goals by having B send a single stateless token T B to A. This token behaves in two different ways, depending on its input. The first task of the token is to generate a random value e upon seeing com x (we discuss the details later); the second task is to generate a notification t for B that A knows the decommitment x. The value e is used for equivocation, and the notification t gives the simulator the ability to extract x. We give further details next. In the high-level description here, we assume the token is created honestly; we deal with a potentially malicious token when we formally define the protocol, below.
Achieving extractability. Similar to Sect. 3, the token only works on authenticated inputs. That is, whenever A wants to query the token on some input, she needs to first ask B to compute a MAC on that input. For extractability, we have A query the token on input (com x , x, r x , τ x ), where r x is the decommitment for com x and τ x is a MAC tag on com x . The output of the token is a random value t that can be seen as a notification to B that A knows the decommitment. As in the previous OT protocol, authentication of the inputs guarantees that A makes exactly one valid query to the token. We can then easily construct a simulator that extracts the value x while emulating F wrap . Modifying Blum's coin-tossing protocol, we have the following step: (B1) A commits to x by executing com x ← SCom(x; r x ). She sends the commitment com x to B, who in turn computes a tag τ x on com x and sends τ x to A. Alice runs the token with (com x , x, r x , τ x ) to obtain output t and sends t to Bob. Bob checks if t is correct.
Achieving equivocation. To allow for equivocation, we further modify the protocol as follows. A sends com x and a dummy commitment com M and gets a tag τ x on com x com M from B. The token is modified so it takes two types of inputs: on input (com x , com M , τ x ), it outputs a random value e, and on input (com x , x, r x , com M , τ x ) it outputs a random value t. In step (B3), instead of sending the decommitment, A now sends x together with a witness-indistinguishable (WI) proof that either x is a valid decommitment of com x , or that com M contains code that outputs the actual output e of the token T B . We use the nonblack-box techniques of Barak [3] to carry out this WI proof. Due to the binding property of com M , and because e is unpredictable, a real-world A cannot commit to code that outputs e. The simulator, however, can take advantage of the fact that it obtains the code of the token generated by B. As in [3] , the simulator's ability to predict the output of the token beforehand is used to achieve equivocation. We remark that in contrast to Barak's work, we do not need to use universal arguments; this is because F wrap is parameterized with a fixed polynomial bounding the running time of the token.
Formal Description of the Protocol
The protocol ψ between A and B consists of an initial token-exchange phase, followed by a coin-tossing phase for generating a λ-bit string. We now describe ψ formally; see also Fig. 11 .
Token-exchange phase. B chooses uniform s, e, t, r t ∈ {0, 1} λ , generates a token T B encapsulating the code described in Fig. 12 , and sends the token to A.
Coin-tossing phase. Let Com denote a statistically binding commitment scheme, SCom denote a statistically hiding commitment scheme, and Mac denote a secure MAC. In this phase, Alice and Bob proceed as follows.
Step 1: B chooses a collision-resistant hash function H ← H and also commits to t using Com, resulting in commitment com t and decommitment r t . It sends H, com t to A.
Step 2: A chooses uniform x ∈ {0, 1} 2λ and commits to x by running com x := SCom(x; r x ). It commits to 0 λ by running com M := Com(0 λ ; r M ) and sends com x and com M to B.
Step 3: B computes τ x := Mac s (com x com M ) and sends τ x and e to A.
Step 4: A runs T B (com x , com M , τ x ) to obtain response e . Next, it runs T B (com x , x, r x , com M , τ x ) to obtain response (t , r t ). A checks if e = e and Open(com t , t , r t ) = 1 and aborts if these do not hold. Otherwise, it chooses a uniform extractor key v and sends (t , v) to B. Step 5: B checks that t = t and aborts if not. Otherwise, it chooses uniform y ∈ {0, 1} λ and sends y to A.
Step 6: A sendsx := Ext(x, v) and gives an interactive WI argument of knowledge that
• either there exist x, r x such that Open(com x , x, r x ) = 1 andx = Ext(x, v).
• or there exist M, r M such that Open(com M , H (M), r M ) = 1 and, treating M as the description of a Turing machine, M(com x , com M , τ x ) outputs e in time at most p(λ), where p is the running time defined by F wrap .
If the proof succeeds, both parties outputx ⊕ y.
We sketch the intuition for the proof of security.
Corrupted A. Since e is uniform, A cannot commit to M that outputs e (except with negligible probability). Thus, we must havex = Ext(x, v). To prove the theorem, we construct a straight-line simulator Sim such that no nonuniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish between (1) an execution involving an honest party and a corrupted party (that without loss of generality, we may take as the dummy adversary who simply forwards messages to/from Z) running protocol ψ in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving the same honest party, functionality F coin , and Sim in the ideal world. We consider the cases of a corrupted A and a corrupted B separately.
Corrupted A
We show a simulator Sim such that no non-uniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish (1) an execution between an honest B running ψ and the dummy adversary A (who simply forwards messages to/from Z) in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving an honest B, functionality F coin , and Sim in the ideal world. The simulator Sim internally runs A, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. In addition, Sim simulates the following interactions with A.
Token. Sim chooses uniform s, e, t, r t and simulates A's receipt of a token from the honest B in the natural way. We let F B wrap denote this token. Whenever A queries F B wrap , the simulator Sim answers the query as in Fig. 12. A query (com x , x, r If A ever makes a valid query (com x , x, r x , com M , τ x ) to F B wrap but τ x was not previously generated by the simulator as a MAC tag on com x com M , or if A ever makes two valid queries (com x , x, r x , com M , τ x ) and (com x , x , r x , com M , τ x ) with x = x , the simulator aborts.
Simulation of the protocol. The simulator sends (toss, sid, A, B ) to functionality F coin and runs the protocol as an honest B through step 4. Upon receiving the message (t , v) (and assuming it does not abort the protocol), the simulator checks if A has made a valid query and aborts if not. Otherwise, it sends (go, sid, A, B , A) to functionality F coin and obtains coins in return. It then uses the value x it has recorded, computes y := coins ⊕ Ext(x, v), and sends y as step 5 of the protocol. If A responds with x = Ext(x, v) and a valid proof of knowledge, then Sim sends (go, sid, A, B , B) to functionality F coin ; in any other case, it simply aborts.
Let Real be the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution of ψ between an honest B and A in the F wrap -hybrid world. (We stress that the view of Z includes the view of A as well as the output of the honest B.) We show that this is computationally indistinguishable from Ideal, the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution between an honest B, functionality F coin , and Sim in the ideal world. To prove this, we consider a sequence of experiments as described next.
Experiment H 1 . Here we imagine a real-world execution of the protocol between A (controlled by Z) and an honest B, where at the end of the execution Z receives the output of B in addition to the final view of A. However, the execution is aborted if A ever makes a valid query (com x , x, r x , com M , τ x ) to F B wrap but τ x was not previously generated by B as a MAC tag on com x com M , or if A ever makes two valid queries (com x , x, r x , com M , τ x ) and (com x , x , r x , com M , τ x ) with x = x . Security of the MAC and binding of the commitment scheme imply that the view of Z here is indistinguishable from its view in Real.
Experiment H 2 . This experiment is identical to the previous one except that the experiment is also aborted if, in step 4, A sends (t , v) with t = t, but A never made a valid query to F B wrap . Hiding of the commitment scheme, along with the fact that t is a uniform λ-bit string, implies that the view of Z here is indistinguishable from its view in experiment H 1 .
Experiment H 3 . Here, we modify the experiment to abort if the proof of knowledge succeeds in the final step of the protocol, yetx = Ext(x, v) (where x is the value used in the unique valid query made by A). We prove that this has only a negligible effect on the view of Z.
Let E be the above event, and let E be the event that E occurs, and in addition, extraction of a witness from the argument of knowledge succeeds. The probabilities of E and E are negligibly close. Let δ(λ) denote the probability of event E . Imagine running the entire experiment twice using the same randomness except for choosing two independent values e, e . The probability that E occurs both times is at least δ(λ) 2 . There are now two possibilities: We conclude that δ 2 (λ), and hence δ(λ), must be negligible.
Experiment H 4 . This experiment is as before, except that instead of choosing uniform y the simulator chooses uniform coins and sets y := coins ⊕ x (where x is the value used in the unique valid query made by A). The view of Z is identical in experiments H 4 and H 3 .
Since the view of Z in experiment H 4 is the same as its view in Ideal, this completes the proof of Theorem 4 for a malicious A.
Corrupted B
We show a simulator Sim such that no non-uniform, ppt environment Z can distinguish (1) an execution between an honest A running ψ and the dummy adversary B (who simply forwards messages to/from Z) in the F wrap -hybrid world and (2) an execution involving an honest A, functionality F coin , and Sim in the ideal world. The simulator Sim internally runs B, forwarding messages to/from the environment Z. In addition, Sim simulates the following interactions with B.
Token. Sim waits to receive a message (create, sid, B, A , M B ) from B to the F wrap functionality, and records M B .
Simulation of the protocol. Sim sends (toss, sid, A, B ) to functionality F coin . In step 2, it commits to M B , resulting in commitment com M and decommitment r M ; it runs steps 3-5 honestly. Assuming it has not aborted the protocol, it sends (go, sid, A, B , A) and (go, sid, A, B , B) to functionality F coin and obtains coins in return. Then, in step 6, it setsx := y ⊕ coins and gives a proof of knowledge using witness M B , r M .
Let Real be the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution of ψ between an honest A and B in the F wrap -hybrid world. (We stress that the view of Z includes the view of A as well as the output of the honest A.) We show that this is computationally indistinguishable from Ideal, the distribution (ensemble) of the view of Z in an execution between an honest A, functionality F coin , and Sim in the ideal world. To prove this, we consider a sequence of experiments as described next.
Experiment H 1 . This is similar to the real-world execution of the protocol, except that com M is generated as a commitment to M B rather than a commitment to 0 λ . Hiding of the commitment scheme immediately implies that the view of Z in experiment H 1 is indistinguishable from its view in Real.
Experiment H 2 . This is identical to the previous experiment, except that now the proof of knowledge is done using witness M B , r M instead of witness x, r x . Witness indistinguishability of the proof system implies that the view of Z here is indistinguishable from its view in experiment H 1 .
Experiment H 3 . Here,x is chosen uniformly rather than being computed asx := Ext(x, v). We claim that the view of Z in experiment H 3 is statistically indistinguishable from its view in H 2 . To see this, consider the information that B has about x. Since the commitment to x is statistically hiding, it reveals no information about x. The only information that F wrap can communicate to B is a single bit based on whether or not it aborts. Thus, with all but negligible probability, the min-entropy of x is at least 1.5λ, and sox in H 2 is statistically close to uniform.
Experiment H 4 . Now, instead of choosingx uniformly, a uniform value coins ∈ {0, 1} λ is chosen and the simulator setsx := y ⊕ coins. It is clear that this does not change the view of Z.
Since the view of Z in experiment H 4 is identical to its view in Ideal, this completes the proof of Theorem 4.
By adapting the proof of the Goldreich-Levin theorem [25] in a straightforward manner (viewing z T h as a "hard-core bit" guessed with probability noticeably better than 1/2 by A ), we can conclude that there exist A , T , and polynomials , q such that A succeeds with probability at least 1/q (λ) in this third game.
We next observe that the answer of the third party in the third game can be compressed. Let a j = (a j 1 , . . . , a j p ) and t = (t 1 , . . . , t p ) . Then for each j, the third party can compute i j , the smallest index for which a j i j = t i j ; it then returns ( j * , i j * ), where j * maximizes i j * (with ties broken arbitrarily). Given ( j * , i j * ) and all the a j , it is possible to reconstruct f (a 1 , t), . . . , f (a , t) .
The answer in this modified game has length log + log p, where and p are polynomial, and thus can be guessed with non-negligible probability. But this implies guessing a uniform input z ∈ F 4λ 2 with non-negligible probability, something that is clearly impossible.
